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6.1  Introduction 
 There is no concept that has captivated philosophers, historians, geographers, and 
political scientists, quite like  power . Scholars have long posed theoretical questions 
concerning the existence, origins, and manifestations of power without settling on 
anything resembling consensus (Machiavelli [1532]  1988 ; Hobbes [1651]  2010 ). 
Normative questions regarding who should rule, under what conditions, and for 
what purposes have similarly been mired in centuries of debate that offer perspec-
tives and insights, but no clear answers (Wilson  1887 ; Waldo  1948 ; Ostrom  2008 ). 
 Differential treatments of power also lie at the heart of a long-standing divide 
among social scientifi c traditions in the study of social-ecological systems (SESs). 
Power is central in the interdisciplinary fi eld of political ecology, where it is under-
stood as a core driver of social-ecological outcomes (Lebel et al.  2010 ). In contrast, 
the “Bloomington School” of new institutionalists (grounded in the work of Vincent 
and Elinor Ostrom et al.) deliberately moved away from the focus on power that 
dominated twentieth-century political science—a focus they felt to be “extreme and 
limiting” ( Aligica and Boettke  2009 , p. 30). Instead, they directed their attention to 
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institutions and how they affect the prospects for self-organized governance of 
common- pool resources (Ostrom  1990 ). 
 Institutions refer to the formal and informal rules, norms, and shared strategies (or 
conventions) that structure human interactions at all levels of social organization 
(Ostrom  2005 ). They are linguistic statements that specify what actions must, must 
not, or may be taken given certain conditions, and, as such, they may exist in written 
form, in the minds of individuals, or both (Crawford and Ostrom  1995 ). New institu-
tionalists focus on how groups can create credible commitments to limit individual 
selfi shness and obtain greater benefi ts for the collective (Dietz et al.  2002 ). When 
groups are able to communicate and develop trust, they are sometimes able to extri-
cate themselves from predicted tragedies by forming institutions that prescribe coop-
erative behavior (Ostrom et al.  1994 ). This approach tends to assume that the outcomes 
of collective action benefi t the group as a whole and that members of a group share a 
common understanding of desired outcomes. These assumptions give this work an air 
of equality and symmetry that often overshadows the importance of power and distri-
butional inequalities. As a result, the new institutionalist view that social-ecological 
sustainability is primarily a function of implementing the ‘right kinds’ of institutions 
is often seen as overly optimistic and simplistic (Agrawal  2003 ; Clement  2010 ). 
 In recent years, new institutional theories and frameworks—inclusive of 
common- pool resource (CPR) theory, the institutional analysis and development 
(IAD) framework and social-ecological system (SES) framework—have faced 
increasing criticism for failing to adequately attend to issues of power, politics, and 
inequality and how they affect environmental governance processes (Agrawal 
 2013 ). For example, Mosse ( 1997 , p. 470) has argued that “historically-specifi c 
structures of power, rather than simply calculated pay-offs (or traditional wisdom) 
underlie the norms and conventions of collective resource use, and account for the 
occurrence and persistence of local institutions of resource use.” Agrawal ( 2003 ) 
has similarly suggested that commons research does not adequately attend to 
 intragroup politics, power, and resistance. He argues that the relationship between 
power and rights to access and use natural resources should complement the narrow 
focus of new institutionalist scholars on internal institutions and rules. 
 This chapter takes these critiques as a point of departure to begin to develop a 
systematic, interdisciplinary approach to integrate power with institutional studies 
of SESs. Our main goal is to assess whether diverse concepts of power can be 
explored and analyzed with the SES framework and whether such an endeavor is 
potentially fruitful. To this end, we structure our study in four stages. First, we pro-
vide an overview of the SES framework, which aims to enhance cross-disciplinary 
theory-building by providing “the most general set of variables [or attributes] that 
should be used to analyze all types of [SES] settings” (Ostrom  2005 , p. 28). Second, 
we outline a process for operationalizing various concepts of power through this 
framework. Third, we illustrate how this process may be used to test a hypothesis—
in this case, that power affects SES outcomes. In this third stage, we review how 
some new institutionalists have thought about, defi ned, and studied power and then 
classify these defi nitions using existing attributes in the SES framework. We then 
identify operational indicators of these attributes using data from a collaborative 
forest governance database—International Forestry Resources and Institutions 
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(IFRI)—and use these to conduct an illustrative quantitative analysis of the relation-
ship between power and the combined social-ecological outcome. Although we use 
quantitative data analysis techniques in our study, qualitative, quantitative, and 
mixed-methods approaches all stand to make distinct and complementary contribu-
tions to understand the role of power in resource governance. Fourth, we refl ect on 
this analysis and its conclusions to consider the extent to which the SES framework 
can be used to integrate power within institutional approaches to studying SESs. 
 This chapter contributes four main arguments relevant to scholars interested in 
bridging power-centered and institution-centered approaches. First, power is, and 
always has been, part of new institutionalist thinking, although the term power is 
rarely invoked explicitly. Second, if the SES framework is to provide a metatheo-
retical structure for interdisciplinary, systematic, and diagnostic studies of sustain-
ability as it intends, then this structure must be able to account for power. Third, the 
SES framework can be used to integrate power-centered approaches with institu-
tional analysis, at least with regards to institutional forms of power. Lastly, there 
remains a need to consider more diverse conceptions of power across the social 
sciences and to determine whether broader integration is possible, and what if any 
implications this has for the SES framework and the study of sustainability. 
6.2  Incorporating Power Within The SES Framework 
 The SES framework is a particularly noteworthy addition to the set of frameworks, 
theories, and models used for the study of sustainability (Ostrom  2007 ,  2009 ). 
However, the SES framework, like its predecessor the IAD framework, appears 
mostly silent on questions of power with the notable absence of terms such as “power” 
or “politics.” Perhaps the primary challenge in incorporating power into an analysis 
using the SES framework is grappling with the many competing and overlapping 
conceptualizations of power that exist across social scientifi c disciplines. While the 
range of conceptualizations of power may at fi rst seem overwhelming, and reviewing 
them in detail is indeed beyond the scope of this chapter, it is nonetheless helpful to 
delineate some broad categories. For example, one branch of political ecology empha-
sizes the primacy of materialist conceptions of power, drawing on ideas rooted in the 
scholarship of Marx. The focus here is on differing control over and access to natural 
resources and the infl uence of material conditions on social and ecological outcomes. 
As Robbins ( 2004 ) asserts, “no explanation of environmental change is complete, 
therefore, without serious attention to who profi ts from changes in control over 
resources, and without exploring who takes what from whom,” (Robbins  2004 , p. 52). 
Other social theorists are more concerned with discursive forms of power, or those ways 
of talking about, representing, and generating knowledge about the world that infl u-
ence human-environment relations. Discourses can both create and limit the realm of 
possibility for how humans may think, act, and behave with regards to the natural 
world. Post-structural approaches to power, such as Foucault’s, conceive of a dis-
course that includes not just the way actors talk about and represent nature and nature’s 
governance, but also the everyday institutions and activities that shape actors’ percep-
tions of themselves, their desires, and their relationships with the world around them. 
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 In this chapter, we choose to focus on operationalizing and measuring  institutional 
conceptions of power, which are distinct from yet always interrelated with material-
ist and discourse approaches. We chose to focus on institutional conceptions of 
power for two reasons. First, the fact that power is an integral aspect of institutions 
is almost always underemphasized in the current literature. Second, due to the SES 
framework’s disciplinary proximity to institutionalism, testing institutional forms 
of power is a reasonable fi rst step. Only after showing that institutional forms of 
power can be taken into account by the SES framework might we move forward in 
conceptualizing how an analysis of materialist, discursive, or post- structural 
accounts of power might be applied within the framework. As we will explain, 
though power is not explicitly included in the SES framework, several key potential 
indicators of institutional power, such as the operational rules governing the sys-
tem,  are included. These attributes can be employed to ask questions concerning 
how different levels of access and control over resources are shaped by institutional 
characteristics of the system and how, in turn, these relationships may infl uence 
social-ecological outcomes. Before turning to this question, we briefl y describe the 
SES framework, and then consider how it may be used to study the effects of power 
on sustainability (for a more comprehensive description, we refer readers to Ostrom 
 2007 ; Basurto and Ostrom  2009 ; Ostrom and Cox  2010 ). 
6.3  Overview of the SES Framework 
 The SES framework explicitly aims to bridge disciplinary and methodological 
boundaries while facilitating the synthesis of disparate studies by providing a com-
mon classifi catory framework containing potentially important SES attributes and 
relationships. Derived from the IAD framework, the SES framework retains the 
action situation (Fig.  6.1 ), a general game-theoretic model of interdependent choice, 
and carries with it much of the intellectual history of the Bloomington School (Kiser 
and Ostrom  1982 ; Ostrom et al.  1994 ; Crawford and Ostrom  1995 ; Ostrom  2005 ). 
In general, outcomes are understood to be the aggregate result of individual 
 interactions and decisions in action situations structured by attributes of four core 
components: resources (RU), resource systems (RS), governance systems (GS), and 
actors (A). Although this simple model is thought to encompass and explain diverse 
outcomes in SESs, analytical complexity emerges from the wide range of attributes 
that collectively defi ne each component and their interactions within action situa-
tions. The most recent elaboration of the SES framework (Epstein et al.  2013 ) 
includes more than 30 potentially infl uential attributes pertaining to the 4 core com-
ponents of SESs (Table  6.1 ). Since the SES framework is structured as a multi-
tiered classifi catory system, each of these attributes can be further unpacked into 
types and subtypes such that the full suite of potentially relevant conditions is effec-
tively unknown (Ostrom and Cox  2010 ). 
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 To date, the SES framework has been used to study a wide range of systems, 
including forests, fi sheries, irrigation systems, and nature-based tourism (Fleischman 
et al.  2010 ; Blanco  2011 ; Gutierrez et al.  2011 ; Basurto and Nenadovic  2012 ; 
Cinner et al.  2012 ; Basurto et al.  2013 ). In adopting a common framework, these 
studies may advance knowledge more rapidly by generating observations on a com-
mon set of attributes that can be readily compared or integrated for large-n analysis. 
Alternatively, individual case studies may be used to add diagnostic pieces to the 
overall puzzle of sustainability (Basurto and Ostrom  2009 ). 
 The structure of the framework is somewhat fl exible, allowing for the integration 
of additional concepts and attributes to improve the study of SESs. Although we 
know of no studies of power that have derived from engagement with the SES 
framework, we do not rush to add attributes here. Given the wide range of concep-
tualizations of power from different fi elds and strands of literature, adding a single 
attribute, “power,” would likely create considerable confusion regarding how such 
an attribute could be operationalized or measured, working contrary to the goal of 
providing a common classifi catory system for SES research. Instead, close exami-
nation of various conceptualizations of power reveals that many indicators thereof 
are already included among the existing attributes of the framework. Thus, our anal-
ysis focuses on the extent to which the existing attributes of the SES framework, 
whether individually or in combination, can be used to operationalize and measure 
power. We then apply these measures to conduct an illustrative analysis of the 
 Fig. 6.1  Analytical structure of the social-ecological system framework ( Source : Based on 
McGinnis and Ostrom  forthcoming ) 
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 Social, economic, and political settings (S) 
 S1 – Economic development. S2 – Demographic trends. S3 – Political stability 
 S4 – Other governance systems. S5 – Markets. S6 – Media organizations. S7 – Technology 
 Resource Systems (RS)  Governance Systems (GS) 
 RS1 – Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture)  GS1 – Government organizations 
 RS2 – Clarity of system boundaries  GS2 – Nongovernment organizations 
 RS3 – Size of resource system  GS3 – Network structure 
 RS4 – Human-constructed facilities  GS4 – Property-rights systems 
 RS5 – Productivity of system  GS5 – Operational-choice rules 
 RS6 – Equilibrium properties  GS6 – Collective-choice rules 
 RS7 – Predictability of system dynamics  GS7 – Constitutional-choice rules 
 RS8 – Storage characteristics  GS8 – Monitoring and sanctioning rules 
 RS9 – Location 
 Resource Units (RU)  Actors (A) 
 RU1 – Resource unit mobility
RU2 – Growth or replacement rate
RU3 – Interaction among resource units 
 A1 – Number of relevant actors
A2 – Socioeconomic attributes
A3 – History or past experiences 
 RU4 – Economic value  A4 – Location 
 RU5 – Number of units  A5 – Leadership/entrepreneurship 
 RU6 – Distinctive characteristics  A6 –  Norms (trust-reciprocity)/social 
capital 
 RU7 – Spatial and temporal distribution  A7 – Knowledge of SES/mental models 
 A8 –  Importance of resource 
(dependence) 
 A9 – Technologies available 
 Action situations: Interactions (I) → Outcomes (O) 
 Activities and processes  Outcome criteria 
 I1 – Harvesting  O1 –  Social performance measures 
(e.g., effi ciency, equity, 
accountability, sustainability) 
 I2 – Information sharing  O2 –  Ecological performance measures 
(e.g., overharvested, resilience, 
biodiversity, sustainability) 
 I3 – Deliberation processes  O3 – Externalities to other SESs 
 I4 – Confl icts 
 I5 – Investment activities 
 I6 – Lobbying activities 
 I7 – Self-organizing activities 
 I8 – Networking activities 
 I9 – Monitoring activities 
 I10 – Evaluative activities 
 Related Ecosystems (ECO) 
 ECO1 – Climate patterns. ECO2 – Pollution patterns. ECO3 – Flows into and out of focal SES 
 Source : Adapted from McGinnis and Ostrom (forthcoming) 
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general hypothesis that “power matters” with regard to SES outcomes. Our application 
is demonstrative in the sense that its primary purpose is to illustrate how such an 
analysis may be conducted; the results then are not intended to be interpreted in any 
conclusive sense. 
6.4  Operationalizing Research on the Role of Power 
in Social-Ecological Systems 
 Building on Adock and Collier ( 2001 ), this section explicates a four-step process for 
operationalizing studies of power using the SES framework (Fig.  6.2 ). This process 
is designed to help quantitative and qualitative researchers avoid or at least be more 
aware of threats to validity that emerge in the transition from theory to measurement 
and on to evaluation or causal inference. While these insights are not exclusively 
relevant to the current endeavor, they are worth highlighting here given the historic 
lack of attention to these important issues in the study of SESs.
 The fi rst step is to explicitly adopt particular defi nitions or theories of power 
relevant to an SES puzzle. The critique that “power matters” is an authoritative com-
ment regarding a relationship between a condition and an outcome. However, it is 
also quite vague given the diverse ways in which power has been defi ned. Although 
a few studies of SESs have attempted to bring power-centered and institution- 
centered theories into constructive dialogue (e.g., Clement  2010 ; Gruby and Basurto 
 2013 ), these initial efforts refl ect a small subset of the diverse ways in which social 
scientists have thought about, defi ned, and studied power. Without explicit agree-
ment on what power is, it seems unlikely that any one test of a theory that “power 
matters” can produce the types of evidence required to support or reject such a 
general hypothesis. The challenge then for scholars seeking to bridge these two 
approaches is to answer which of the many conceptualizations of power matter and 
under which conditions. 
 The second step in this process is to either classify the chosen defi nition in terms 
of one or more attributes of the SES framework, or add attributes that appear to be 
missing. In cases where defi nitions directly map onto attributes, this process is 
straightforward; in others (i.e., defi nitions of power); the classifi cation process typi-
cally involves a number of assumptions that must be made explicit. For example, 
 Fig. 6.2  Steps in testing the effects of power with the social-ecological system framework.
 Source : Elaborated from Adcock and Collier ( 2001 ) 
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Clement ( 2010 ) attempts to explain variations between policy intentions and out-
comes by “politicizing” the IAD framework and adding two classes of attributes, 
namely “discourse” and “political-economic context.” While she develops a con-
vincing argument that “power matters” and illustrates its effect through a qualitative 
case study, her addition of “discourse” to the IAD framework refl ects only one of 
many possible classifi cations of this concept. In fact, one of the core goals of the 
SES framework is to systematically organize concepts and their defi nitions such 
that results are driven by empirical relationships rather than competing defi nitions 
or measures (Ostrom  2007 ). 
 Upon classifi cation of a defi nition, the third step is to choose how to  operationalize 
or measure that attribute for empirical analysis. This can be as simple as establish-
ing the presence or absence of some attribute, or involve more complex multivariate 
measures or qualitative descriptions. Finally, the fourth step is to analyze the effects 
of measured attributes on the outcomes of interest. Qualitative researchers might 
analyze these effects by using process tracing to bring together multiple pieces of 
evidence in order to systematically evaluate the claims of competing hypotheses 
(George and Bennett  2005 ; Collier  2011 ). Quantitative researchers may examine 
data by using some form of signifi cance test and statistical model. 
6.5  Analyzing Power Within The SES Framework 
 The preceding discussion highlights the complexity inherent in testing a hypothe-
sis that “power matters.” It demonstrates the importance of being deliberate and 
explicit about the necessary and potentially value-laden choices concerning defi ni-
tions, classifi cations, and measurement, not to mention those imposed by the 
choice of inferential methods. In this section, we seek to illustrate how the SES 
framework may be used to organize a rigorous, broad research agenda on the 
effects of power by proceeding through each step of the process just outlined. Our 
analysis is divided into three main subsections, each of which proceeds through all 
four steps for specifi ed institutional conceptualizations of power. More specifi -
cally, within each subsection, we discuss (1) the distinct institutional defi nition(s) 
of power that we are seeking to test, (2) the author(s) associated with that defi ni-
tion, and (3) how that defi nition may be classifi ed within the SES framework. 
Finally, we use the IFRI database to (4) operationalize the attribute(s) and test 
whether there is a statistically signifi cant relationship between each measure of 
power and a social-ecological outcome. 
 The IFRI database is perhaps the single most infl uential and contemporary 
source of information with which commons scholars develop and test hypothe-
ses concerning the interactions of people, the environment, and institutions in 
small-scale SESs. The database is composed of a variety of continuous, categor-
ical, and descriptive variables—including a wide range of attributes present in 
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the SES framework—that are collected using a consistent case-study approach 
(Wertime et al.  2007 ). The database enables multiple-methods research, although 
in recent years, as the number of case studies have increased to include more 
than 400 forests and 600 user groups, IFRI scholars have increasingly turned to 
large-n quantitative studies that have historically been absent in the commons 
literature (Andersson and Agrawal  2011 ; Chhatre and Agrawal  2008 ,  2009 ; 
Persha et al.  2011 ; Coleman  2009 ; Coleman and Fleischman  2012 ). The IFRI 
database was chosen for this analytical exercise due to its rigor and its reso-
nance with the SES framework. A comparable database for the study of large 
scale systems is the International Regimes database which asks questions con-
cerning the formation, boundaries, and processes of international regimes in 
response to a wide variety of social, economic and ecological problems 
(Breitmeier et al.  2006 ; Young and Zürn  2006 ). Although certainly useful for a 
quantitative study of power, the international regimes database, because of its 
emphasis on international-scale processes, is less suited to respond to specifi c 
 critiques from political ecology that tend to emphasize the effects of power on 
individuals and communities. 
 The sample used in this study was constructed in the following way. First, we 
selected the user group as the unit of analysis. Next, we dropped cases in the fol-
lowing order: (1) repeat observations of a user group, (2) groups found in the 
United States, and (3) those with missing data on any of the dependent variables. 
The omission of the US cases is common, as they differ substantially from the 
other countries in terms of economic development and the ways in which forest 
resources are used. Finally, we randomly dropped duplicate observations of user 
groups that use multiple forests, as well as forests containing multiple user 
groups, in order to generate a sample including a maximum of one observation 
per forest and user group. The dependent variable measures social-ecological 
benefi ts and is constructed by summing two multifactor indexes that measure 
social and ecological benefi ts, respectively. Social or livelihood benefi ts are mea-
sured by performing a factor analysis similar to that of Chhatre and Agrawal 
( 2009 ), based on the contributions of a forest to the fuelwood, fodder, and timber 
needs of a group. Ecological benefi ts, on the other hand, are measured by per-
forming a factor analysis on the polychoric correlation matrix of (1) a forester’s 
perception of vegetation density, (2) a forester’s assessment of species diversity, 
and (3) user group perceptions of the condition of the forest. These attributes 
were similarly used in Andersson and Agrawal ( 2011 ), although they simply 
averaged these fi gures. 
 The results are compiled in Table  6.2 , which records the one-way relationship 
between a particular measure of power and the combined social-ecological benefi ts 
(the dependent variable). In most cases we report differences in means between 
groups that possess and lack power. However, polyserial and pairwise correlations 
are used for Ostrom’s and North’s defi nitions given that they are measured using 
continuous and ordinal indicators, respectively. We generally predict a positive rela-
tionship between the power of a group and the dependent variable.
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 Table 6.2  A preliminary assessment of the effects of institutional power on social-ecological 
benefi ts derived from forests 
 Classifi cation  Operationalization  Effect 
 Commons (1924) and Riker (1980): Institutional control 
 The power of a group depends upon their rights and responsibilities with regards to the use and 
management of forest resources 
 GS5 Operational rules  Perceived fairness of operational rules 
(1 = Fair; 0 = Unfair) 
 +0.443** 
 GS4 Property-rights system  Owner(s) of forest is a member of the user 
group (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
 −0.334 
 GS6 Collective choice rules  User group is responsible for rulemaking 
(1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
 −0.029 
 GS8 Monitoring and sanctioning  User group monitors use of forest commons 
(1 = Seasonally, Year round; 
0 = Occasionally, Never) 
 +0.450** 
 Ostrom (2005): Extent of control and value of opportunity 
 The power of a group depends upon the level of control over collective choice situations and the 
economic value of resources 
 GS6 Collective choice rules and RU4 
Economic value 
 User group is responsible for rulemaking 
(1 = Yes; 0 = No)* 
 0.095 
 The commercial value of forest commons 
(0 = Low; 4 = High) 
 Lukes (2005): First face of power 
 A group lacks power when they participate in collective choice processes, but policies are not 
congruent with their subjective interests 
 GS5 Operational rules and GS6 
Collective choice rules 
 User group participates in rulemaking 
and does not perceive the rules as fair 
(1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
 −0.102 
 Lukes (2005): Second face of power 
 A group lacks power when rules are not congruent with their subjective interests and they do not 
participate in collective choice processes 
 GS5 Operational rules and GS6 
Collective choice rules 
 User group is not responsible for 
rulemaking and does not perceive 
the rules as fair (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
 −0.434** 
 North (1990): Path dependence and bargaining power 
 The power of group covaries with the age of a group or organization 
 A3 History of use  The age of the forest user group (years)  0.159*** 
 ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 
6.6  Institutional Power 
 The conceptualizations of power discussed in this section, while distinct from 
each other, share a common assumption that institutions—again: rules, norms, 
and shared strategies—carry within their particular form and structure the abil-
ity to infl uence societal outcomes. During the fi rst half of the twentieth century, 
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an important theoretical innovation of “old” institutionalism was to highlight 
the distinction between institutional and non-institutional aspects of social phe-
nomena. Institutional factors are those that the policy process can directly infl u-
ence through laws, rules, and regulations, while non-institutional factors can 
only be infl uenced indirectly by means of the particular institutions that are 
created (e.g., economic or demographic conditions) (Ostrom  1976 ). Embedded 
within this distinction is an opportunity to study the infl uence of the former on 
the latter, or of the ability of institutions to make a difference on a range of 
existing conditions. 
 For example, John R. Commons, a particularly prominent “old” institutional-
ist, proposed an institutional theory of markets that sought to explain the ways in 
which economic power resulting from the accumulation of wealth, uneven access 
to resources, and/or monopolies on the means of production could be mitigated 
by what he referred to as  working rules . These working rules are scripts that tell 
individuals what they may or may not, must or must not do as they transact with 
others (Commons  1931 ). Through an emphasis on working rules, Commons 
( 1924 , p. 6) examined the “principles of collective control of transactions through 
associations and governments, placing limits on selfi shness, that are more 
recently included in economic theory” to build a foundation for understanding 
how the social injustices of laissez-faire capitalism might be mitigated. For 
Commons, institutions were embodiments of power and thus carried with them 
the possibility of rectifying what he saw as the problems of the day. Since then, 
multiple institutional theories have been proposed that each point to the central 
role that institutions play in allowing individuals and groups to make and adhere 
to choices in complex environments. Nonetheless, Commons’ typically positive 
view of institutional power has receded as scholars such as Riker ( 1980 ) lament 
the democratic implications of an institutional theory of political processes. The 
most notable of these implications is that political outcomes are not only the 
result of the will or “tastes” of the people but also of the institutions that are used 
to make decisions and the political skills or “artistry” of those who seek to 
manipulate agendas and exploit opportunities for their own ends. In other words, 
institutional power may be used and manipulated by individuals or groups in 
pursuit of their own interests, and thus can serve as the source of, as well as the 
solution to, social problems. 
 The Bloomington School of new institutionalists does not often explicitly 
include power as a distinct or circumscribed concept in its frameworks and anal-
yses. Nonetheless, for scholars interested in questions of institutional power, the 
Bloomington School has adopted a broad defi nition of institutions (Crawford and 
Ostrom  1995 ; Ostrom  2005 ) that can be interpreted as a potential carrier of 
power. First, institutions are said to include  de jure institutions (rules-in-form or 
rules on paper) and  de facto institutions (rules-in-use), as well as social norms 
and shared strategies. All of which are nested into layers of institutions that 
determine how institutions at other levels may be changed; these layers are dif-
ferentiated into operational-, collective-, and constitutional-choice situations. In 
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the context of resource governance,  operational-level institutions govern how 
resources are accessed and used. Such rules may state, for example, that only 
members of a given community—not outsiders—may access a forest, as with 
community forest concessions in Mexico (Alcorn and Toledo  2000 ; Bray et al. 
 2006 ). Other rules might determine what types of resources may be extracted, 
during what seasons, and using which harvesting tools.  Collective-choice institu-
tions, in turn, provide a framework for how—and by whom—operational-level 
rules are created and modifi ed. A collective- choice institution might state that a 
majority of forest users are required to approve a rule change or, alternatively, 
that a local leader has the power to unilaterally create or alter operational rules. 
Operational-level and collective-choice-level rules are almost always nested in at 
least one more institutional level— a constitutional level —that sets the con-
straints within which collective-choice rules are determined. The US Constitution 
is an example of a set of constitutional-level institutions that determine the 
procedures through which, and the bounds within which, other rule- making 
procedures are themselves modifi ed (Ostrom  2008 ). For an institutionalist con-
cerned with power and its effect on individuals and groups, the implication is that 
one must explore not only the effects of operational rules but also the formal 
and informal institutions that affect how operational rules are chosen, as well 
as the configurations of actors that hold power to initiate and manipulate 
these processes. 
 We begin the analysis with the most basic defi nition of institutional power, 
which suggests that any and all institutions have the capacity to privilege some 
groups, at the expense of others (Riker  1980 ; Immergut  1998 ; Pierson  2000 ). Thus 
all institutions, including operational rules (GS5), property-rights systems (GS4), 
collective- choice (GS6) and constitutional rules (GS7), as well as monitoring and 
sanctioning rules (GS8) merit consideration as unique classifi cations of institu-
tional power. The IFRI database is replete with such details, which allow us to 
measure group-level subjective perceptions of operational rules, to determine 
whether users participate in collective-choice and monitoring processes, and to 
establish whether any member(s) of a group possess property rights over the for-
est commons. The assumptions tested by these measures are that the institutional 
power of a group is higher when (1) operational rules refl ect subjective interests 
of the group of resource users, (2) group members participate in the rule-making 
process, (3) group members monitor conformance to rules, and (4) group mem-
bers hold enforceable property rights. Broadly speaking the results indicate a 
positive relationship between social- ecological benefi ts and groups that possess 
power in the form of favorable operational rules (GS5) and participate in monitor-
ing and sanctioning processes (GS8). Power as characterized by participation in 
collective-choice processes (GS6) and property-rights systems (GS4) did not have 
a signifi cant relations with the dependent variable, although this is possibly the 
result of the bivariate analysis that fails to control for additional sources of hetero-
geneity (Table  6.2 ). 
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6.7  Elinor Ostrom’s Defi nition of Power 
 Although the Bloomington School is often criticized for the general absence of 
power in related studies, Ostrom ( 2005 ) offers a clear and concise defi nition of 
power in her seminal work on the IAD framework,  Understanding Institutional 
Diversity. According to Ostrom:
 the “power” of an individual in a situation is the value of the opportunity (the range in the 
outcomes afforded by the situation) times the extent of control. Thus, an individual can have 
a small degree of power, even though the individual has absolute control if the amount of 
opportunity in a situation is small. The amount of power may also be small when the oppor-
tunity is large, but the individual has only a small degree of control. ( 2005 , p. 50) 
 This defi nition has several implications for power and how it can be studied. 
First, it suggests that a value that corresponds to power can be assigned to each 
actor, and does not necessarily imply a zero sum situation. Second, power also 
varies with the expected benefi ts and costs of a situation, such that the power of 
actors holding a small amount of control over a valuable opportunity may be 
equivalent or greater than that of an actor holding a large degree of control over a 
less valuable opportunity. For example, an individual vote among many on a very 
important and potentially rewarding issue may offer more power than unilateral 
control over a situation with a less valuable outcome. Finally, power can be mea-
sured and said to exist as a “power to” do something regardless of whether an 
actor chooses to make use of it. 
 Ostrom’s ( 2005 ) defi nition of power could be operationalized at any of the 
 institutional levels (i.e., operational, collective choice, constitutional), although we 
chose to focus on the collective-choice level. Collective-choice rules are often seen 
as particularly important sources of power because they allow participants to mod-
ify the rules that govern operational situations from which fl ow the majority of 
instrumental benefi ts and costs. For instance, when forest users operating under a 
set of operational rules are confronted by a new disturbance or threat, such as exter-
nal poachers (Fleischman et al.  2010 ), participation in collective-choice processes 
allows them to rapidly adjust those rules to changing conditions. We measured 
power as the product of a binary measurement of participation in decision-making 
processes regarding operational rules (GS5) and an ordinal measure of the commer-
cial value of the forest (RU4). Thus, the power of a group is highest when they 
participate in collective-choice processes and the commercial value of the forest is 
high, while it is lowest when they do not participate in collective-choice processes 
and the commercial value of the forest is low. Participation is just one of many 
potential measures of the concept of control that is indicated in Ostrom’s defi nition 
of power and may not carry a strong correspondence with control over decision- 
making processes. The results suggest that Ostrom’s defi nition of power has a posi-
tive but insignifi cant relationship with the combined social-ecological benefi t 
measure used in this study. 
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6.8  Steven Lukes’s Three Faces of Power 
 A particularly prominent treatise on power that draws upon institutionalist thinking 
is Steven Lukes’s ( 2005 )  Power: A Radical View , initially published in 1974. Lukes 
defi nes power in terms of the realized ability of one group to affect the other in a 
way that is contrary to their interests. A clear distinction from Ostrom’s ( 2005 ) defi -
nition of power is that, for Lukes, power exists only when it is exercised and only in 
situations where one of those groups possesses “power over” the other. He is also 
particularly attentive to multiple manifestations or “faces” of power. Lukes views 
these “faces” of power as three distinct processes that individuals or groups use to 
exercise their power over others, two of which are clearly linked to institutional 
processes. 
 The fi rst face of power is by far the easiest to identify and study, as it relies upon 
the observation of overt confl ict between two or more groups participating in some 
political environment (Lukes  2005 ). When decisions are ultimately made that favor 
one group at the expense of the other, power is said to exist. As an example, a group 
possessing a 50 % plus one majority in a two-party legislature using majority rule 
could be said to hold “power over” the other group, assuming there are differences 
in subjective interests. While Lukes acknowledges the general validity of this view, 
he also points to its inadequacy for explaining situations where power is exercised 
by limiting the participation of some groups. This is the second face of power, 
wherein groups with identifi able interests or grievances are prevented from even 
representing their interests in political processes by virtue of the overt and covert 
actions of some other group. For example, one group may exercise power over 
another by preventing the fi rst group from voting, or by constructing institutional 
barriers that increase the costs of participation in political or administrative decision- 
making processes (Yackee and Yackee  2006 ; Obar and Schejter  2010 ), thereby pro-
ducing policies that favor the subjective interests of the dominant group. Lukes also 
offers a third face of power centered on the manipulation of the subjective interests 
of a group as described below:
 Is it not the most supreme and insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever 
degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in 
such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can 
see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable or 
because they value it as divinely ordained and benefi cial? ( 2005 , p. 28) 
 This conception may or may not be institutional, depending upon the ways in 
which one conceptualizes the relationship, if any, between institutions and “percep-
tions, cognitions, and preferences.” While the neoclassical economic model of the 
individual assumes that preferences are stable, recent advances from various fi elds 
provide strong evidence that preferences and perceptions are infl uenced by cultural 
experience and participation over time in particular institutional environments 
(Agrawal  2005 ; Henrich et al.  2006 ). Alternatively, institutions—as prescriptive, 
linguistic constructs—can, in some sense, themselves be considered a type of belief. 
According to Crawford and Ostrom ( 1995 ), a shared strategy is a linguistic 
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statement consisting of actions to be taken by individuals defi ned by some attribute(s) 
under certain conditions. As an example, they offer a situation where an individual 
who initiates a call that is disconnected will call back. This simple strategy or social 
convention addresses a simple coordination problem where either both parties wait 
for the other to call, or perhaps try simultaneously and receive busy signals by gen-
erating shared expectations. Although beliefs about others’ actions are certainly rep-
resentative of the type of shared strategy envisioned by Crawford and Ostrom, it is 
less clear that the same could be said for beliefs about policies or rules that lack a 
social dimension. 
 Lukes’s ( 2005 ) three faces of power provide three different conceptualizations, 
two of which we are able to operationalize in this study. Lukes’s third face of power 
was not operationalized due to the diffi culty of analyzing outcomes based on belief 
systems and an inability to distinguish between subjective and objective interests 
using the data stored in the IFRI database. Lukes’s fi rst face of power focuses on 
subjective perceptions of policy outcomes or operational rules (GS5) between two 
or more groups that participate in collective choice venues (GS6). This was opera-
tionalized by distinguishing between groups that participate in rule-making pro-
cesses that fail to produce rules that align with their subjective interests and all other 
groups, with the assumption that the former lacks, or is subject to, the power of 
another group. The results indicate that the fi rst face of power has little impact on 
the combined social-ecological outcome. 
 The second face of power refers to groups whose subjective interests are not met 
by operational rules (GS5), but who also do not participate in collective-choice 
processes (GS6). This is operationalized by distinguishing between groups where 
operational rules are perceived to be unfair and do not participate in rulemaking, 
and all other combinations. As opposed to the fi rst face of power, Lukes’s second 
face has a statistically signifi cant and negative relationship with the combined 
social-ecological outcome. There is, however, an important caveat to this claim. 
Lukes clearly situates his defi nitions of power in relative terms, where one group is 
able to affect another in a way that is contrary to the second group’s interests. This 
analysis assumes the existence of that other group, be it the state or another user 
group, ignoring the possibility that the lack of participation and dissatisfaction with 
rules is a result of other factors, most notably intragroup processes or a collective 
failure to self-organize. 
6.9  Douglass North and the Institutional Matrix 
 While both Ostrom’s and Lukes’s new institutionalist conceptualizations of power 
can be easily abstracted from any particular situation, some institutional political 
economists embed conceptualizations of power within historically contingent 
contexts that are diffi cult to account for in quantitative approaches. For example, 
Douglass North ( 1990 ), the economic historian, asked why the economies of 
some countries performed better than others, and why those countries that fared 
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worse did not simply adopt institutions that enhanced performance. The answer, 
according to North, is a set of institutions that resists change via a variety of struc-
tural and active processes. The most commonly cited process is increasing returns, 
wherein institutions generate a positive feedback process that favors movement in 
the same direction of prior decisions by virtue of some combination of benefi t 
fl ows and increasing exit costs (Pierson  2000 ; Arthur  1989 ). Power enters the 
discussion of increasing returns when institutions privilege some members of a 
group or society with a greater share of the benefi ts and greater institutional con-
trol that enhances their ability to bargain in collective-choice settings. Pierson 
( 2000 ) draws upon the community power debate and Lukes ( 2005 ) to discuss how, 
over time, increasing returns processes may transform power from an overt 
expression of wills to a latent and then hidden confl ict as the institutional matrix 
reinforces itself:
 Increasing returns processes can transform a situation of relatively balanced confl ict, in 
which one set of actors must openly impose its preferences on another set (“the fi rst face of 
power”), into one in which power relations become so uneven that anticipated reactions 
(“the second face of power”) and ideological manipulation (“the third face”) make open 
political confl ict unnecessary. Thus, positive feedback over time simultaneously increases 
power asymmetries and renders power relations less visible. (Pierson  2000 , p. 259) 
 These path-dependent processes suggest that the greatest indicator of power 
may not be found in individual institutions or their simple interactions but rather 
in the continuity of a particular form of organization to manage transactions or 
resolve a policy problem. Pierson ( 1996 ), for instance, discusses how, once the 
welfare state has been established in democracies, it tends to persist because it 
generates a set of incentives that make change particularly costly for politicians. 
North ( 1990 ), in a more negative light, suggests that the lack of economic devel-
opment in some countries is the result of ineffi cient forms of economic organiza-
tion that persist because those that have invested in that form of organization 
generate increasing returns and greater bargaining power to ensure its continuity. 
In any case, both point to the time dimensions or historicity of institutions as an 
important indicator of their power. 
 Path-dependent forms of power bound up in institutional matrices are perhaps 
the most abstract of our defi nitions of power. We classify path-dependent power in 
terms of a user group’s history of use (A3), although we recognize that this attribute 
relates to several potentially infl uential dimensions of use. Nonetheless, we assume 
that the longer a group has existed in a recognizable form using a particular resource, 
the more likely they will have built up a set of institutions, or an institutional matrix 
that creates power for the group against other groups and the state. In contrast, a 
user group that lacks power is unlikely to be able to maintain a recognizable form, 
and would instead be characterized by the formation and decay of different groups 
in the same geographical area. This follows North’s argument that the persistence of 
organizations (i.e., formal and informal groups) in a given environment is tied to 
their bargaining power. Thus, power can be measured indirectly by considering the 
length of time that a group has been organized in a recognizable form. This classifi -
cation was fairly easy to operate with the IFRI database, which allows us to measure 
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the approximate age of the user group that participates in rule-making processes. 
The results show that this path-dependent form of institutional power is associated 
with positive social-ecological outcomes (Table  6.2 ). 
6.10  Discussion 
 The measures of power used in this illustration refl ect a pragmatic attempt to 
 operationalize a study of how institutional forms of power relate to  social-ecological 
benefi ts. Some of our fi ndings appear straightforward. For instance, our results indi-
cate that groups with power, as exercised through operational rules and monitoring 
and sanctioning processes, are associated with better social-ecological outcomes. In 
addition, we fi nd that Lukes’s ( 2005 ) second face of power is associated with a par-
ticularly large and negative social-ecological outcome. That is, groups that are dis-
satisfi ed with operational rules but are unable to enter collective-choice situations 
and modify those rules, are less likely to develop long-term sustainable patterns of 
use. These results are not entirely surprising given that they correspond to Ostrom’s 
( 1990 ) design principles and continue to receive support from various sources 
(Chhatre and Agrawal  2008 ; Coleman  2009 ; Cox et al.  2010 ). Notwithstanding the 
patterns of association found in this study, important questions remain as to whether 
power is accurately captured by the classifi cations and measures that were used, and 
the extent to which the evidence presented provides a basis for causal inference. 
This section engages in self-critique to examine some limitations of the considered 
approach to analysis. 
 Although some defi nitions of power, particularly those that refer to specifi c 
 institutions, were readily classifi ed, it is far from certain that their operationalization 
accurately refl ects the power of a group. For instance, with regards to institutional 
control, groups are assumed to hold greater power if operational rules are perceived 
to be fair, if they participate in rulemaking, or if they own the forest commons. 
There is, however, considerable room for debate as to whether a group could be said 
to be powerful if it possesses one of these attributes but not others. In addition, 
North’s ( 1990 ) view of bargaining power as an output of early choices that generate 
a process of increasing returns and path dependence is equally problematic. 
According to our results using North’s conceptualization of power, groups that man-
age to persist in a recognizable form over an extended period of time are more likely 
to be associated with positive social-ecological outcomes. The proposed explana-
tion is that groups develop a matrix of supportive institutions that set them on a 
distinct historical trajectory (North  1990 ; Pierson  2003 ). However, while a group 
can be seen as an informal organization whose survival depends upon its ability to 
generate a continuous stream of benefi ts to its members, measures of its age may be 
prone to suffer from idiosyncratic measurement error or measure concepts com-
pletely unrelated to power, or even its inverse. India’s caste system, for instance, has 
for centuries been used to defi ne groups; however, it systematically assigns power 
to some of these groups while withholding it from others. In other words, a group 
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may persist precisely because it fi nds itself on the less powerful side of socially, 
politically, or institutionally entrenched power inequities. 
 Finally, as defi nitions become more specifi c to involve interactions among 
 attributes and measures, important questions concerning the level of measurement 
must be considered. For instance, Ostrom’s ( 2005 ) defi nition involving the extent of 
control (presumably varying between 0 and 1) and value of opportunity (presum-
ably a continuous variable) was operationalized using a binary and ordered variable, 
respectively. The way in which Ostrom’s defi nition of power was operationalized 
refl ects the availability of data, but also draws attention to the potentially confound-
ing role of measurement of the dependent and independent variables. 
 Even if one accepts the general validity and assumptions related to defi nitions, 
classifi cations, and measurements offered in this study, there are several reasons 
why one might still reject the evidence provided. To begin with, most causal infer-
ence in the positivist paradigm rests upon the general validity of three attributes of 
an analysis: (1) association between a cause and an outcome, (2) isolation of poten-
tial causes from other attributes of the environment, and (3) the direction of effects 
(Bollen  1989 ). Association is generally the least controversial, and in this study 
were measured using standard methods such as difference of means and correla-
tions. Isolation and direction are typically more problematic, as they ask the 
researcher to separate causes from all other attributes that may bias estimates and 
establish whether the “cause” is in fact responsible for producing the “effect.” 
Randomization, matching, or quasi-experiments are often considered the best 
means with which to isolate factors (Holland  1986 ; Shadish et al.  2002 ; Rubin 
 2005 ), although in some cases structural models and even linear regression may be 
suffi cient for pseudo-isolation (Pearl  2012 ). Establishing the direction of causal 
effects from cross-sectional observational data is even more problematic. Temporal 
priority (i.e., a gap between the observation of a cause and the outcome), or direct 
manipulation in an experimental environment, are usually suffi cient to infer the 
direction of a causal effect (Brady  2008 ). However, in the absence of either, most 
directional claims using observational data rest upon logical and theoretical under-
standings of the phenomena. In this case, the analysis neither seeks to isolate power 
from other infl uences, nor does the cross-sectional data allow us to infer whether a 
measure of power precedes the outcome, or instead whether the outcome is actu-
ally a cause of power. 
 A fi nal critique of the illustrative analysis is that many of the same measures 
already appear in the literature on the commons (Chhatre and Agrawal  2008 ,  2009 ; 
Coleman  2009 ) and have been merely recast in terms of power. Institutional control, 
for instance, is typically studied in isolation from its normative power-laden implica-
tions. This highlights several points that merit additional discussion. First, power is, 
and always has been, a feature of the commons literature, which should be  self- evident 
from many of the design principles (Ostrom  1990 ). Minimal rights to organize, par-
ticipation in collective-choice processes, and the accountability of monitors all con-
cern different types of institutional power held by a group of resource users. That is 
far from being a power-neutral approach to the study of social-ecological phenom-
ena; power is as an integral part of commons theory and the SES framework. 
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 However, the critiques are not entirely without merit. Compared to some 
 disciplines, such as political ecology, new institutionalism often softens or hides the 
normative implications of power imbalances behind a veil of game-theoretic termi-
nology and a pragmatic emphasis on designing institutions that produce benefi cial 
societal outcomes, however those may be defi ned. In other words, accompanying 
the shift in language is a sense that something meaningful is lost. Thus, bringing 
together multiple disciplines to study power within the SES framework compels 
researchers to engage explicitly with challenging and inevitable tradeoffs between 
critical and pragmatic approaches. Moreover, the emphasis on groups, broadly 
labeled resource users, likely overlooks a wide range of power relations within 
groups, most notably differential power between elite and non-elite members 
(Vedeld  2000 ; Iversen et al.  2006 ; Mwangi  2006 ). Finally, it is clear that, while 
power exists implicitly in the SES framework, it is not given a prominent position; 
and if trends continue, the range of theorizing and studying power in the institution-
alist tradition will remain overly narrow. 
6.11  Conclusions: An Interdisciplinary Agenda 
for the Study of Power in SESs 
 This chapter has illustrated that the SES framework holds great potential for social 
science integration, and may serve as a bridge between power-centered approaches 
and institution-centered approaches to the study of social-ecological systems. It fur-
ther demonstrates that the SES framework is equipped with a wide range of attri-
butes that can be used to study to several defi nitions or theories of power. Although 
the analysis presents empirical results with associated signifi cance, the study  does 
not provide defi nitive answers to the questions of whether any individual type of 
power matters, or which of the many alternatives best captures the concept of power. 
Instead, our primary goal was to assess whether asking such questions with the SES 
framework is possible and whether such an endeavor is potentially fruitful. We 
believe that the answer to both questions is yes, but that there remains considerable 
work to be done with regards to other theories of power, measurement, and evalua-
tion before the framework could be said to facilitate such an endeavor. 
 The four methodological steps that we applied in this study provide guidance 
that other researchers can use to integrate other theories of power within the SES 
framework. Rather than simply assuming that power exists in some objectively 
observable way, researchers must attend to the ways in which (1) the values of exist-
ing SES attributes differentially affect different actors and groups and (2) different 
actors and groups contest and reshape the value of SES attributes. For example, 
instead of asking  what type of operational rules produce better social-ecological 
outcomes , we asked  how the perceived fairness of operational rules infl uences out-
comes . We reoriented questions about the form of collective-choice institutions to 
ask whether groups have the power to control the outputs of institutional decision- 
making processes, and what effect this has on social-ecological outcomes. If we use 
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the SES framework to conceptualize a social-ecological system made up of the four 
key subsystems and the variable subsets within them, then to wrestle with the role 
of power within such a system is to examine the shadow that those variables cast on 
the material, institutional, and discursive attributes of a varied set of actors. 
 Questions of power must be investigated in a space of inquiry that is once- 
removed from the social-ecological system; it does not consist of the subsystems and 
variables within those subsystems but rather the heterogeneous effects of those vari-
ables on different groups, as well as the process through which heterogeneous actors 
contest those variables. In studying the effects of power, we are not posing questions 
about the direct relation between the variables and outcomes but about the effects 
that the differentiated meanings and implications of those variables for different key 
actors have on social-ecological outcomes. This is why we make the claim, at least 
regarding institutional conceptualizations of power that “power” or “politics” need 
not appear as attributes, themselves, within the SES framework. Rather, as we sug-
gest, institutional conceptualizations of power are realized in the relationships 
between existing attributes and their implications for a specifi ed group of actors. 
 Similarly, future research about the relationships between power and  sustainability 
need not, necessarily, add new power-related attributes the framework. Rather, the 
process of research design and collection should carefully attend to the connections 
between indicators of existing attributes, their implications for particular groups and 
their relationship with social and ecological outcomes. Implicit in an approach that 
locates power not as a single, discrete attribute but as relationships between one or 
more attributes and a group of actors, is a claim about the ontology of power itself. 
Specifi cally, it suggests that power is a composite theoretical construct made up of 
attributes and relationships. This claim is further supported by the existence of a wide 
range of distinct conceptualizations of power from across disciplines. Thus, to engage 
in a cross-disciplinary study of power in the context of SESs requires us to decon-
struct the vague and variegated concept,  power , and specify its component parts and 
the relationships among them. The SES framework is well suited for this task. 
 The general approach adopted in this chapter to study institutional forms of power 
may be used to advance the study of other conceptualizations. Many materialist 
approaches from political ecology, for example, suggest that power exists as a result 
of unequal access and control over wealth, natural resources, or the means of produc-
tion. An initial glance at the SES would suggest that many of the attributes, including 
the economic value of the resource, socioeconomic characteristics of the resource 
users, resource users’ dependence on the resource, and property rights regimes, may 
be put to use to develop appropriate measures of materialist conceptions of power. 
Moreover it seems likely that the framework could similarly structure studies of 
discursive conceptualizations of power in terms of communicated knowledge, norms, 
and mental models that shape individuals’ beliefs and behavior. Indeed, some attributes 
of the SES, such as knowledge of the SES/mental models as well as social norms, 
may provide an opportunity to better understand what, if any, differences exist 
between knowledge and discourse, and how they are transmitted across groups. 
 Ultimately, however, whether the SES is fully equipped in its current form to 
facilitate research on the role of power across all disciplines will require further 
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theoretical, conceptual, and empirical work that is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Nonetheless, this general strategy, which focuses on identifying existing SES 
attributes and the relationships among groups with respect to those attributes, 
encourages researchers to embrace interdisciplinary approaches to power, while 
thinking rigourously about how to move through the research process from 
conceptualization to operationalization and measurement. The SES framework 
was designed precisely to facilitate such interdisciplinary work and to provide a 
foundation upon which multiple disciplinary approaches to research may fi nd, if 
not agreement, then mutual intelligibility. 
 Finally, further issues arise as researchers move from measurement to analysis 
of whether particular conceptualizations of power matter. This analysis presumed 
to evaluate the relationship between power and social-ecological benefi ts by posit-
ing a single causal step from the indicator to the outcome. However, many scholars 
view power in terms of a complex web of self-reinforcing historical processes, 
institutions, and resources that collectively privilege some groups over others 
(Pierson  2000 ; Benjaminsen et al.  2009 ). Furthermore, studying some individual 
indicator of power in isolation from others may fundamentally confl ict with the 
ways in which power operates to either sustain or degrade social-ecological sys-
tems. This refl ects a growing debate in the social sciences concerning the ways in 
which attributes or variables are understood to affect social phenomena. The classic 
approach that corresponds to multivariate quantitative methods is to assume that 
variables have a conditionally independent and additive effect on a dependent vari-
able (Freedman  1999 ). In contrast, many qualitative methodologists view outcomes 
in terms of a unique confl uence of slow- and fast-moving causes that interact in 
complex ways to produce often unexpected results (Pierson  2003 ). More recently, 
a third perspective has emerged that seeks to strike a balance between these two 
extremes and suggests that outcomes depend upon the state of combinations of 
attributes that collectively defi ne a case (Ragin  2000 ; Basurto and Ostrom  2009 ). 
We suggest that the SES framework offers scholars engaging diverse theoretical 
and methodological approaches an opportunity to structure their debates in system-
atic and coherent terms. 
 The SES framework is a bold and ambitious tool meant to serve a diverse 
 audience of interdisciplinary scholars, many of whom focus explicitly on questions 
of power and inequality. It is unfortunate that the framework has yet to take greater 
strides in this direction, forcing scholars to develop ad hoc solutions, or, more 
likely, to choose alternative, more disciplinary-focused analytical tools. In perpetu-
ating the shift toward a positive theory of environmental governance, the SES 
framework neglects the important normative question as to why we should care in 
the fi rst place. The fi elds of environmental governance in particular and public 
policy in general exist to confront the problems of society and promote “human 
dignity” (Lasswell  1951 ). Power is an integral part of human affairs, and we believe 
that power ought to be given greater attention within institutional studies of SESs. 
However, such an endeavor must seek to explicate the positive and normative 
implications of diverse forms of power that characterize “alternatives futures” 
(Ostrom  2008 ). 
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